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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Idaho Industrial Commission ruled incorrectly on the legal question of whether a
corporation paid severance to its former employee.

Because the written contract between

employee Ms. Connie Schoeffel (Schoeffel) and employer Thome Research, Inc. (Thome) plainly
provides that the payments were for other purposes, and Idaho Code§ 72-1367(4) does not apply,
the payments were not severance. Rather, Thome's primary purpose was paying Schoeffel to stay
employed with Thome, among other things - not "as a result" of severance of her employment.
In its response, the Idaho Department of Labor (Department) continues to argue ( 1) that
the contract between Thome and Schoeffel does not mean what the plain language of the contract
says, (2) that Idaho Code Section 72-1367(4) is the only relevant authority the Industrial
Commission needed to consider, and (3) that the questions in this appeal may be decided upon the
basis of the substantial evidence standard. As described below, the Department's arguments fail
on all three points.
First, Schoeffel received bargained-for compensation for staying with Thome throughout
a key time of business transition for the company, for maintaining the confidentiality of Thome' s
proprietary information and trade secrets, for not disparaging Thome, and for a release of any
employment claims she may have had against the company. Because the contract is clear and
unambiguous, the Industrial Commission was required to have considered it and to have made its
decision based upon the plain language of the contract provisions, which do not provide for
severance. The Industrial Commission was required to do so notwithstanding the Department's
arguments that the contract provisions must not actually intend what the language says.
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Second, as the language of Idaho Code Section 72-1367(4) makes clear, the statutory
definition of severance does not apply to the bargained-for payments made from Thome to
Schoeffel. The Industrial Commission should have recognized this and ruled in favor of Thome
and Schoeffel.
Third, despite the Department's argument that the appeal before this Court is a factual
review on a substantial competent evidence standard, this appeal seeks an interpretation from this
Court regarding both the contract between Thome and Schoeffel, and the definition of severance
within 72-1367(4). Both are questions oflaw, over which this Court has free review.
Accordingly, Schoeffel and Thome ask that this Court reverse the decision of the
Industrial Commission as a matter of law.
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

TO DECIDE THIS APPEAL ON THE MERITS, THIS COURT SHOULD LOOK
TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.
The two parties to the contract at issue here are the (now former) employee Schoeffel and

the employer Thome. These two parties agreed to a deal whereby Schoeffel would receive
payments upon the completion of certain conditions of performance under the contract.
Because the terms of the parties' contract do not provide for severance, the Department's
arguments to the contrary, based upon the timing of the payments, should not prevail. Rather,
Thome permissibly structured the contract to pay Schoeffel once her performance was
substantially complete. It was prudent to do so, just as it was prudent to devise payments to be in
compliance with existing Idaho law. Finally, if the Department seeks to argue or suggest- for the
first time on appeal to this Court - that the contract is a sham, the issue must have been raised and
supported by some competent evidence below.
1.

Agreement Provided That Payment Was to Occur Following Part
Performance by Schoeffel.

The Department suggests that because Schoeffel received payment from Thome only after
her employment ended, and did not receive any payments during the time she was working, that
these facts are of particular importance and have a significance over all else, even contract terms.

See Respondent Brief at 8-11.
But the record shows that Thome had a business objective in offering certain employees,
including Schoeffel, a contract. General Counsel Mr. Kim Pearson testified before the Department
hearing officer that, in November of 2016, Thome announced to all employees in North Idaho that
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the company would be relocating to South Carolina. Tr. 23, L. 4-6. The company's transition
included two employee programs: a relocation program and a retention program. Id. at L. 6-9.
The purpose of the retention program was to enable Thome to continue to produce its products at
a time when the new production was coming online in South Carolina. Tr. 23, L.11 to Tr. 24, L.1.
Thus, Thome devised a program to keep up production of its products from November of 2016
until at least June of2018 at its only operational facility (in Idaho). Tr. 23, L. 11-18. Mr. Pearson
testified that it was "critically important that [Thome] was able to maintain manufacturing in our
Dover, Idaho, facility while a new facility was coming online in South Carolina. Therefore, the
employee retention program was based on offering incentives to employees to stay, although they
would know that they would be unemployed at some date certain." Id. L. 15-21.
So, it was designed that an employee's performance of the retention obligation preceded
Thome' s payment to the employee under the terms of the contract. Had Thome paid an employee
as soon as the employee agreed to the 18-month bargain, it is foreseeable that an employee might
not have remained with Thome throughout the transition period. Had Thome not designed the
contract payments in this way, it might have experienced a labor shortage, and the primary purpose
of the contract (retaining employees to ensure that Thome could produce products) might not have
been realized. If hired, temporary or more short-term employees might not have maintained the
same level of proprietary information, or might not have been as agreeable to sign a nondisparagement clause. The confidentiality of Thome' s information might not have continued to
be protected if the company shared confidential information with temporary employees. Thome
would have needed to spend a considerable amount of administrative and human resource capital
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to hire temporary employees. Thus, it was prudent, and served Thome' s legitimate business need,
for the company to delay payment of contract funds until partial performance was reached.
Thome was within its rights to do so, and this business decision should have no bearing
on whether Schoeffel should receive unemployment benefits.

2.

Thorne Research Should Not Be Criticized for Prudently Complying with the
Letter of the Law

Second, the Department suggests that Thome' s payments, which did not begin until after
the end of Schoeffel' s transition period, should raise some suspicion that the company was trying
to skirt the law with this purported "scheme." See, e.g. Respondent Brief at 11 (noting that Kim
Pearson's intent as Thome's General Counsel was to "follow as closely as [he] could ... the
underlying law of Parker ... [to provide payment] not in consideration of any prior services
rendered to Thome ... but [for] the obligations [Schoeffel] was undertaking, [and for which] Thome
agreed to pay her bargained-for compensation,)" and see id. at 15 (suggesting that companies may
not use the unemployment trust fund to pad separation benefit packages offered to employees).
But Thome was not avoiding the law. The company was prudent in doing its due diligence
to determine that a bargained-for agreement with an employee could be in compliance with the
law as discussed within Parker vs. Underwriters, even after the 2005 amendment to Idaho Code §
72-1367(4). Parker vs. Underwriter Laboratories, Inc., 140 Idaho 517, 96 P.3d 618 (2004).
Thome was no more trying to skirt the law than a company trying to comply with any of our
various tax laws is trying to evade the law by seeking tax advice and following it to the letter. In
the company's estimation, it was in full legal compliance in advising Schoeffel that she did not
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need to report her bargained-for compensation as severance under the law in Idaho, and in offering
the Agreement to her. Parties to a contract should not be penalized for trying to act within the
limits provided by law.

3.

The Agreement Itself Is the Best Evidence of the Intention of the Parties

Third, the Department essentially argues, without foundation or evidence, that certain
terms of the Agreement between Schoeffel and Thome are a sham, or that the parties did not intend
two of the four conditions described within the Agreement. See, e.g. Respondent's Brief at 10-11.
Yet the language of the contract specifically provides that payment to Schoeffel is
conditioned upon each of four contract provisions: the retention obligation, the release of claims
obligation, the non-disparagement obligation, and the confidentiality obligation. Exhibit p. 38, ,-r
6. There is no evidence in the record to support the assertions by the Department that two of the
conditions do not apply to Schoeffel. See, e.g. Respondent's Brief at 10-11. The Department
argues that the release of claims and the confidentiality provisions should not be given weight. Id.
at 11 ("viewing these clauses in the context of Schoeffel' s employment, there was no evidence
presented that Schoeffel had any actual or threatened claims against Thome Research to be
released, or that her kitchen manager position exposed her to any confidential or proprietary
information.").
This argument was not raised at the hearing officer level, nor on appeal to the Industrial
Commission, and cannot be considered now. See, R. pp. 13-14 (Request for Reconsideration), pp.
32-3 7 (Brief ofIDOL). But even if this issue had been raised, it would be the Department's burden
to introduce evidence of a sham contract, had the Department believed it to be so. The Agreement
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itself is the best evidence of the intent of the parties. See Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creamery
Ass'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 1994). It cannot now be argued that Thome

and Schoeffel have to prove what Schoeffel knew of Thome' s trade secrets, or what employment
claims she might have had against Thome. It is high-handed of the Department to presume, based
upon nothing but Schoeffel's job title, that she could not have understood or could not have
accessed any confidential information as a kitchen employee, and such a supposition is
unsupported in the Record. To say that she would have no knowledge of information like customer
lists or how precisely Thome produced its products, assumes facts not in the record.
This Agreement between Thome and Schoeffel cannot so easily be cast aside simply based
upon the Department's conjecture, without evidence, to suit the result given by the Industrial
Commission. Instead, because the Agreement does contain the relevant terms, and consideration
was exchanged for the bargain, the contract should be upheld. The contract does not provide for
payments that are reportable severance under the Idaho Employment Security Law and, therefore,
the Industrial Commission's decision should be reversed.
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B.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY UPHELD THE
DEPARTMENT'S DECISION WHICH IMPLIES THAT IDAHO CODE § 721367(4) OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IS THE ONLY RELEVANT
AUTHORITY HERE - NOT THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The Department argues, and the Industrial Commission's decision presumes, that Schoeffel

must report every cent she was paid during the time period when she was receiving unemployment
benefits, no matter what the source. But this argument ignores that Idaho's Employment Security
Law and the Rules promulgated under those statutes, are limited by the statutory language.
The November 16, 2018 Income Determination informed Schoeffel that she had reported
income "which can include holiday, vacation, bonus, or severance income." Exhibit p. 11. Idaho
Code§ 72-1312(1) and§ 72-1367(4) were cited in the Income Determination. Id.
Idaho Code § 72-1312( 1) provides that, for purposes of calculating benefits, a compensable
week for a claimant is a week wherein that claimant has no work or less than full-time work in
which wages payable are less than one and a half (1 ½) times a claimant's weekly benefit amount.
And § 72-1367(4) provides that any wages in excess of that amount shall be deducted from the
claimant's weekly benefit.
Wages are further defined within § 72-1328, as including "all renumeration for personal
services

from whatever source,

including commissions

1

and bonuses." 1 I.C.

§ 72-

"Wages" are generally defined by a statute as all money paid for work or a service from
any source and an enumerated list follows, which includes commissions and bonuses, as well as
tips received while performing employment services, and employer contributions under a qualified
401k plan. See generally, I.C. § 72-1328(1)-(3). Here Schoeffel's payment under the terms of her
Agreement was not wages earned from working, nor was the payment for any service, nor was it
a part of her employment compensation. Of course, it was also not a commission, bonus, tip, nor
a qualified 401 k plan contribution.
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1328(1)(a)(emphasis added). Schoeffel did not receive payment from Thome for personal services.
In fact, the Agreement instructs "Thome and Schoeffel agree that the bargained-for compensation
described in Paragraphs 6 and 7 is not made in consideration of any prior services rendered to
Thome by Schoeffel as an employee of Thome ... " Exhibit p. 38. Schoeffel's payments were not
for performing any work (i.e., services), rather, they were in exchange for giving up certain rights
Schoeffel had, in exchange for payment. See Exhibit p. 38, ,r,r 6-7.
Although the Idaho Legislature was free to ignore the prior definition of wages as a
payment for work or personal service - and it did so when amending Idaho Code§ 72-1367(4) to
define severance as wages - the Legislature still did not choose to define severance in a manner
that encompasses the payments Schoeffel received.
Similarly, the Rules promulgated by the Department do not speak to the payments
Schoeffel received.

Despite the language of the Income Determination that she received

compensation which "can include holiday, vacation, bonus, or severance income," her payment
does not fall under the description of vacation pay, severance pay, wages for services performed
prior to separation, or any other category of reportable income for purposes of unemployment
benefits. See IDAPA 09.01.30.525(11) (Severance Pay), IDAPA 09.01.30.525(12) (Vacation
Pay), IDAPA 09.01.30.525(14) (Wages for Contract Services), IDAPA 09.01.30.525(15) (Wages
for Services Performed Prior to Separation).
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As such, Schoeffel' s payment was not wages, nor severance, and was not reportable
income for purposes of an unemployment benefit determination.
Accordingly, the Industrial Commission should not be permitted to construe this disclosure
against an applicant such as Schoeffel, when it is clear that the statutes and Rules are silent on such
payments. The Industrial Commission's decision should be reversed.
C.

THE DEPARTMENT ARGUES FROM THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD.

The Department suggests that the issue to be decided on appeal is a factual question, and
that the relevant standard of review on appeal is whether substantial competent evidence exists to
uphold the Industrial Commission's decision. See, Respondent's Brief at 5 (noting that the only
issue on appeal is whether substantial competent evidence exists to support the Commission's
decision). This is the correct standard for an appeal of a factual question, but here, Thome and
Schoeffel ask this Court to review questions of law.
The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over questions of law on appeal from the
Industrial Commission. See Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prod., Inc. 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265,
1269 (2003).
Here, analysis of the contract between Thome and Ms. Schoeffel is necessary for the
outcome of this appeal. Analysis ofldaho Code § 72-1367(4), and interpretation of the scope of
the definition of "severance" under the Idaho Employment Security Law could also arise within
this appeal. Interpretation of contracts and statutes involve questions of law. The Department
concedes as much when it argues that the Commission's legal conclusion is supported by the
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statute. Respondent's Brief at 8 ("the Commission's legal conclusion is supported by the plain
language of Section 72-1367(4))." (emphasis added).
The Department contends that it is presumed to enjoy deference in its reading and
application of the statute. See, Respondent's Brief at 6 (citing Garner v. Horkley Oil, 123 Idaho
831, 833, 853 P.2d 576, 578 (1993) and Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't ofIns., 154 Idaho 1, 3, 293
P.3d 150, 152 (2013)). But deference is limited to a reasonable interpretation not contrary to the
express language of the statute. See id. Here, the Industrial Commission has not analyzed the
Agreement between Schoeffel and Thome, which is the very agreement defining the nature of the
payments. Declaring that a payment is severance by ignoring the best evidence is not a reasonable
statutory interpretation. A finding that the nature of the payments here is severance is contrary to
the express language of the statute - because the statute is silent on these particular payments.
Accordingly, this Court is not bound by either the contractual or the statutory interpretation
of the Industrial Commission, and free review should be exercised here over these questions of
law. See Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prod., Inc. 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003).

III.

CONCLUSION

Appellants Connie Schoeffel and Thome Research, Inc. have shown that the plain language
of the contract is controlling, and the payment from Thome to Schoeffel does not fall under any
reportable income provision of the Employment Security Law. It is respectfully requested that the
decision to the contrary by the Industrial Commission be reversed.
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DATED this 4th day of February, 2020
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER

Isl Amy A. Lombardo
Jim Jones
Amy A. Lombardo
Attorneys for Claimant/Appellant Connie Schoejfel
and Employer/Appellant Thorne Research, Inc.
By
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of February, 2020, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:

~

Doug Werth
Deputy Attorney General
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
317 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83 73 5
Telephone: (208) 332-3570
Facsimile: (208) 332-8098
Attorneys for Respondent
Idaho Department ofLabor

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
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Facsimile
Email:

Isl Amy A. Lombardo
Amy A. Lombardo
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